Mali: The perils of intervention

Source: http://dailymaverick.co.za/photos/cache/2012-03-28-ecowas-allison-706-410.jpg

Original author: Giuliano Luongo, Economist at the University Federico II in Naples
Original source: http://www.unmondelibre.org/Luongo_Mali_intervenir_150812, checked on 21-08-2012.
(Translated from French to English by Thomas den Hollander)

As in all situations of political and military crisis, a proposed external military intervention is discussed as a way to resolve the crisis in Mali. ECOWAS has attempted to finalize a plan of action under a UN mandate. To assess the chances of such an intervention, it is necessary to recall briefly the conditions of military-political framework of the country.

A new 'chessboard' (i.e. situation)

Northern Mali proves to be the most unstable region of the country and it initially fell under the control of Tuareg rebels allied with the Muslim extremist groups, but now it is entirely within the territory of jihadists. Various Islamist militias arrived  to push aside their former Tuareg allies, establishing themselves as the sole masters of the region.

This movement is not a homogeneous Islamist faction, but consists of various forces active in the major cities of northern Mali. The city of Gao in the hands of Mujao (Movement for unity and jihad in West Africa), AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) reigns over Timbuktu and Kidal is under the control of militia Ansar Eddine. The Mujao is a movement formed  by dissidents of AQIM, which maintains good relations with the Sahrawis and the Polisario Front.

Besides the differences (mainly related to interest in the distribution of power), these three Islamist groups share common goals such as "maintaining the territorial cohesion of Mali" (instead of the Tuareg, who battle for a liberated Azawad as a sovereign state) and the introduction of Islamic law in its most extreme form. In recent days, there have been two first cases of application of Sharia (1).

Forces of the Tuareg MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) are very weak but still active: there are ongoing negotiations for their support to the national army against the Islamists. In the south, there is an increasing formation of independent militias determined to fight the Islamists. They are often formed by ex-northerners forced to flee.

Intervene?

In this context of constant instability at the international level the hypothesis of a military intervention continues to be evaluated - an idea already launched in the first days of the revolt of the Tuareg. Recently, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence Minister, Laurent Fabius and Jean-Yves Le Drian, declared the support of France to send a peacekeeping force organized by the military of ECOWAS, to contain and finally eliminate the presence of extremists. France, in all cases, will not take the initiative, in a, what Mr Le Drian defined as "inevitable", intervention to prevent the transformation of Mali an Islamic state. Paris is concerned about a "backlash" from terrorist (executions of hostages in Mali, attacks on its territory ...).

Given their weak military capabilities, African countries seem less enthusiastic, hoping foreign support (UN and USA in the first place) to conduct a major intervention operation. Few countries will be able - and determined - to send troops: Niger, Mauritania and Ivory Coast seem determined to intervene early and directly (because they are concerned to have an "extremist neighbor "), even if they do not have the necessary logistical means (and Ivory Coast has its own  internal problems as well).  Algeria refuses to engage outside its borders and Senegal (already committed in Guinea-Bissau) prefers to follow diplomatic channels with Burkina Faso to reach stabilization of the situation in Mali. In this context, the delegation of Burkina Faso met with representatives of Ansar Eddine, who call themselves "pro" mediation and willing to travel to Ouagadougou to continue to discuss, in contrast to Mujao or AQIM which have not met with foreign diplomats. Diplomacy, therefore, seems still an option but is a long complex: it will be chosen if there is no real possibility to intervene militarily.

In this regard, it should be remembered that an invasion with the goal of defeating a well organized terrorist organization is never easy, as we we’re taught Afghanistan. Mali is also a vast territory and very difficult to (re) conquer and control, where the majority jihadist forces are formed by soldiers who know their territory, and are therefore difficult to face. Again relations with the civilian population would be crucial: even if civilian groups openly demonstrated against the Islamists, many are unhappy with the previous administration and especially the brief period of the Tuareg, which are often accused of theft and rape against populations. Many people will join the ranks of the Islamic militias, thinking that only the jihadists can stabilize the country.

Another problem lies in the definition of targets and the conditions of employment of the "anti-extremist" militia: it will be difficult to generate results with an attack "front" because terrorists do not occupy isolated camps but begin to mix with the population in cities. A gradual infiltration with big secret services to neutralize the terrorist forces would work well. In addition, it would prevent the interposition force from making the country more unstable with excessive use of force: every mistake, every civilian casualty would result in increased support for extremists.

Should the authorities finally understand that the way for the country's stability does not only involve suppressing extremist tendencies but also to avoid that current foes will become part of the a new government, we should work together to construct a legitimate government that does not become a new oppressive institution. And, unfortunately, this phase would probably be even more difficult than the fight against "terrorists".

(1)    On July 29, a couple was unmarried and stoning August 8th there was the first amputation of the hand of a suspected thief.

Source: http://imgsrv.wtax.com/image/WiresGraphic/2012-08-15T034923Z_1_CBRE87E0AME00_RTROPTP_2_INTERNATIONAL-US-MALI-CRISIS-FORCE.JPG

African Islamists gather in Northern Mali. The number of Islamist fighters in the Sahel has multiplied by twenty in two years.

Ansar Dine rebels near Timbuktu, northern Mali. Photograph: Romaric Ollo Hien/AFP/Getty Images
Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/17/islamist-extremists-alqaida-uprising-mali
 

According to a study U.S. security, 6000 terrorists roam the Sahel

By Karim Aimeur - Thursday, July 19, 2012 (lexpressiondz.com - ALGERIA)

Original source: http://www.maliweb.net/news/insecurite/2012/07/19/article,80992.html
(Translated from French to English by Thomas den Hollander)

July 19, 2012 Topic: Insecurity, northern Mali

They are heavily armed and well trained to deal with any military assault.

The Sahel becomes a quagmire. A study by the American security research centre, AGWoold, the number of terrorist activating the Sahel has increased 20 times between 2010 and 2012.

According to this study, 300 to 500 in 2010, it rose to more than 6,000 terrorists, equipped and trained in 2012. A boon for the troops of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, which wants to establish theological principalities in the region. But how are terrorists recruited in this particular region in northern Mali? "We are many Africans who came from everywhere to join the mujahedeen from Gao," says a young Ivorian. This young man even has changed his name and is now called
Ahmed El Guédir. It is one of hundreds of recruits in the northern city of Mali controlled by radical Islamists.

The young West Africans landed armed in Gao from Gourma, a province in eastern Burkina Faso, Mali's neighbor but also from Senegal. According to the French news agency AFP, within two days, more than 200 Africans, with an average age of 16, were recruited by the Movement for the uniqueness of Jihad in West Africa (Mujao). New recruits are grouped in two camps in the city and have to undergo military and religious training, said one of the terrorist leaders in the region. Hundreds of Boko Haram fighters, a radical Islamist group responsible for numerous attacks in Nigeria, are now present in northern Mali alongside the Islamists, according to Bilal Hassan, a leader of Mujao in Gao. "Here there are Malians, Somalis, Ivorian, Senegalese, Ghanaians, Gambians, Mauritanians, Algerians, Guineans, Nigerians, there are all Muslims here," said he to the AFP, adding that for a Muslim, there is no nationality or boundary. A native of Mali's neighbor Niger, Hisham Bilal was the first black man to lead a katiba, a fighters brigade, in northern Mali. "There will be other blacks (at the head of katiba). The world is the same for black Muslims, white or other colors", he said.
"The President of Niger (Mahamadou Issoufou) says he will attack us. God only knows. 40% of our workforce are Nigerians. Jihad, God willing, we will take it quickly in Niger", he threatens again.

Mr. Issoufou expressed support for military intervention in northern Mali, envisaged by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to drive out the Islamists.

Bilal Hicham removes this risk by running: "What force is stronger than God? Let them come and bomb us. " "We are all Muslims, at least over 90% in the sub-region (West Africa). We can talk together to find a solution. But if someone decides to use force, then the strength of God will be stronger”, he said. For him, Jihad must be everywhere in West Africa. He says they are ready to plant bombs in West African countries "if necessary".

Ansar Eddine (Defenders of Islam)and Mujao, both allied with al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), controlled the three administrative regions of northern Mali, Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu at the end of March, after ousting the secular Tuareg rebels secessionist.

They have begun to impose Sharia in Timbuktu and destroyed mausoleums of Muslim saints, provoking outrage in Mali and abroad. For their part, people feel abandoned by Gao and cope as best they could with the presence of radical Islamists in their territory.

Apart from banks and some buildings destroyed during the capture of the city in late March and the legacy of fighting in June near the Governor's Palace, Gao looks almost normal, except that there isn’t a single bar or hotel because they are all closed by Islamists.

Will Azawad become a safe haven for Islamic terrorists?

For decades Touareg from the Sahara have been fighting for a, as they call it, a "free Azawad" in northern Mali. During the revolt in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Touareg fighters have been reported fighting on both sides. In this conflict they've received training and weapons and when the revolt was over they renewed their offensive against the government of Mali in January of this year under the name of Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA). When a coup d'état by discontent soldiers, the discontent ironically enough came from the lack of support of the troops in their war in northern Mali, in March paralized the Malian government even more as they already were in their battle against the Touareg, the latter grabbed the opportunity and successfully intensified their offensive, occupying almost all of Azawad, including the three largest cities: Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.

After, as they said, "achieving their goals", the Touareg declared an independent Azawad. But as soon as the news of the victory spread, trouble doomed on the horizon. Pretty fast after the occupation of Timbuktu reports came in that not the flag of Azawad was flying over the city, but the black flag of Jihad.

Since the beginning of the new offensive in January, the Malian government claimed that members of  Islamic extremist groups Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine were fighting with the Touareg to "liberate" Azawad. The MNLA always denied that this was the case, but as soon as Timbuktu was occupied, the Islamic extremist fighters of Ansar Dine took control and imposed Sharia law on the city. This is a disturbing development. The main goal of the MNLA was to liberate Azawad, Ansar Dine and other extremist groups fight for imposement of the Sharia in the whole of Mali and reject independence. Another group of Islamic extremists from Nigeria also fight for imposing Sharia in their own country: Boko Haram.

The Malian web medium Maliweb.net reported that a few hundred fighters of Boko Haram were seen in Gao and if this is true then the fate of Azawad is uncertain. With AQIM, Boko Haram and other extremist groups taking advantage of the lack of government in Azawad, there is a chance that they will take up their arms together against the Touareg, try to expel the Touareg and make Azawad or parts of it an Islamic state, based on Sharia law and a safe haven for Islamic extremists. If this will happen, a new Yemen or Somalia (where government control is very limited and in some areas non-existent) isn't unthinkable, this time in the unstable region of North West Africa where governments are struggling to take on and solve their internal problems and where the security situation is vulnerable to extremists who want to topple the imbalanced power of the government over distant and hard to control areas. By doing this they will be expanding their own power base and become a force that will be increasingly hard to defeat.

The near future will determine what the fate of Azawad will be. The consequences of an outcome in which the flag of Jihad will rule the whole of Azawad, can be far reaching.