Mali: Background of Iyad Ag Ghali, leader of Ansar Dine

Iyad Ag Ghali (source: lignet.com)

Translated from French by TdH, original source: 02/10/2012 at 10: 35 By L. Touchard, B. Ahmed, Ch Ouazani / Jeuneafrique.com (http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Articles/Dossier/JA2698p024-033.xml11/mali-terrorisme-mouammar-kaddafi-mplamali-iyad-ag-ghali-rebelle-dans-l-ame.html)

Iyad Ag Ghali is a 54 years old Malian. He is the leader of Ansar Dine.

From the region of Kidal, northern Mali, Iyad Ag Ghali is a Irayakan, family of the Ifoghas. It is in Libya, however, where he made his debut in the early 1980s: in his early twenties he chose to join the Islamic Legion of Colonel Gaddafi - Mali, a victim of repeated droughts since 1969, has nothing to offer to him.




Islamic Legion

In Libya, Ag Ghali manages to get noticed. He was sent to Lebanon to fight the phalanges and Christians, according to some sources, aside from some shooting in Chad, in the course of the 1980s, before returning to Mali when the "Guide" declares the dissolution of the Legion. Ag Ghali is disappointed, but soon found another cause to champion, becoming one of the leading figures of the Tuareg rebellion: it was he who, at the head of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA), attacked the town of Menaka, June 28, 1990. Six months later, the Tamanrasset agreements were signed under the auspices of Algeria, brought an end to the fighting, but the rebels were deeply divided. Ag Ghali founded the Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA), which brought together the most moderate Tuaregs, he didn’t hesitate to confront his former companions and sometimes to allied with the Malian army... His military superiority isn’t doubted. For many Malians he is the one that brought peace to the North in the late 1990s.

Gradually, the man got in to contact with radical preachers like the Pakistani Jamaat al-Tabligh ("association for preaching"). In  1999 Iyad Ag Ghali has changed: he stopped shaking hands with women, made his wife wear a veil and spends most of his free time in mosques. Surprising? Not so much. This radicalization is associated with a strong anti-Western sentiment, sharpened in training camps in Libya. In addition, the economic crisis has pushed many Malians, both sedentary and nomadic, into the arms of religion.

In 2003, Ag Ghali is involved with the fundamentalist cause, but not Jihadism: he said to be hostile to terrorism and suicide bombings. This "state of mind" makes him the ideal intermediary to negotiate the release of hostages held by Islamic Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Thus, in August of the same year the government in Bamako asked Ag Ghali to intercede with Abou Zeid for European tourists kidnapped in Algeria - which he did with success. Three years later, in May 2006, the anger is brewing again in Northern Mali. Tuareg accuse the authorities of failing to meet their commitments. Ag Ghali meets with President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT), but negotiations fall short. He then approaches Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, another great figure from irredentist Tuareg, who died in August 2011. Algeria is again involved, obtains the signature of new agreements for peace (the Algiers Accords, signed in July 2006) and, as in the previous uprising, Ag Ghali traded his fighting uniform for a uniform of a man of peace.

Ahmada Ag Bibi: the bosun

Ahmada Ag Bibi and Iyad Ag Ghali know each other for a long time. In the early 1990s already, they both were in the People's Movement of Azawad (MPA). Ag Bibi is a great activist for the Tuareg cause, but that does not stop to soak in more obscure cases and to be linked to negotiations for the release of Western hostages. In Ag Bibi’s address book there are bandits, smugglers, politicians in Bamako and Algiers, and even members of several intelligence services (he was a member of the parliamentary committee Defense and Homeland Security). Also he was the chairman of the parliamentary group for Mali-Algeria friendship and in November 2011 he accompanied  the former colonel in the French army, Jean-Marc Gadoullet, to negotiate for the release of Abu Zayd AREVA and VINCI hostages.

    When the North rised again in January 2012, Ag Bibi joined the MNLA and Ansar Dine, driven by both realism and friendship towards Ag Ghali. He is not attached to secularism, but believes, as the Ansar Dine diplomat Alghabass Ag Intallah, in negotiating "peaceful solutions" and could therefore be the man to talk to. "Only Algeria can play a role of mediator between the parties to the conflict," he said.

To serve his ambitions, he will not hesitate to turn against his "partners”.

Exile

ATT, who knew Ag Ghali could be useful but also feared his growing influence, appointed him counsel consular in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) in November 2007. The head of state is as much to thank for cutting him from his supporters. But exile was short-lived: in 2010, the Saudis suspected Al Ghali of being in contact with members of Al-Qaeda and expelled him. Back home, he used again his address book (which was further enriched during the episode in Jeddah) to negotiate hostage releases and build a personal fortune. His name comes up repeatedly when discussing the fate of AREVA employees kidnapped in Niger in September 2010.

By the end of 2011, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) didn’t have an official status yet, but Ag Ghali already boasted to be the leader. In vain. Managers of the future rebellion didn’t want to see this shady man get into the political and media area. He is too closely linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, formerly GSPC) and suspected of being linked to Algiers as well. Also they have not forgiven him the 1990’s infighting either.

Ag Mohamed Najim, another veteran of the Islamic Legion who Ag Ghali cordially detests, is therefore preferred. This is a slap for Ag Ghali but he didn’t mind. He created his own training group, Ansar Dine. Probably he hoped to cause dislocation of MNLA, which weaknesses he knows so well the. At the same time, Ag Ghali also renounced to become the successor of the amenokal (traditional leader) of Ifoghas, the old Intallah Ag Attaher preffered his son, Alghabass Intallah Ag. Again, the bitterness is strong, but he cannot afford to openly confront the patriarch.

It is better to deal and work hand in hand with Ag Intallah, who is highly respected in the region. Ag Ghali holds his hand in June 2012. The MNLA is dying, and now it is Ansar Dine which discuss with the mediator of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. The former soldier of Gaddafi is now recognized as a key player in the Malian crisis. If he distanced himself from the Salafists, as incited by foreign diplomats, he might even become an ally. Moreover, if he considers that direct confrontation with AQIM can serve his ambitions, he will not hesitate to turn against its current "partners". Abou Zeid, Mokhtar Ould Mohamed Hamada and Belmokhtar Kheirou know better than anyone else.

Alghabass Ag Intallah: heir and diplomat

Originally Alghabass Ag Intallah isn’t  a warlord. As a member of the National Assembly, he is especially the son of the powerful Ifoghas chief and his designated successor - a line that allows him to benefit from many contacts into the Persian Gulf, including the royal family of Qatar. When the Tuareg rebellion broke out in January 2012, he first ranked alongside the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) - though always advocated for dialogue with Bamako - then rallied Ansar Dine. Ag Intallah is not a fanatic, and his choice is probably more pragmatic - the fragmentation of MNLA is unequivocal - ideologically. Today, Ag Intallah is the political face of Ansar Dine, it’s ambassador. He is the one who is received by the mediator of the crisis, the Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore. Iyad Ag Ghali knows too much for having interest in linking his fate to reign Ifoghas.

A video in which Ag Ghali leads the prayer before the Aguelhok Massacre (WARNING: GRAPHIC CONTENT)

Mali: The perils of intervention

Source: http://dailymaverick.co.za/photos/cache/2012-03-28-ecowas-allison-706-410.jpg

Original author: Giuliano Luongo, Economist at the University Federico II in Naples
Original source: http://www.unmondelibre.org/Luongo_Mali_intervenir_150812, checked on 21-08-2012.
(Translated from French to English by Thomas den Hollander)

As in all situations of political and military crisis, a proposed external military intervention is discussed as a way to resolve the crisis in Mali. ECOWAS has attempted to finalize a plan of action under a UN mandate. To assess the chances of such an intervention, it is necessary to recall briefly the conditions of military-political framework of the country.

A new 'chessboard' (i.e. situation)

Northern Mali proves to be the most unstable region of the country and it initially fell under the control of Tuareg rebels allied with the Muslim extremist groups, but now it is entirely within the territory of jihadists. Various Islamist militias arrived  to push aside their former Tuareg allies, establishing themselves as the sole masters of the region.

This movement is not a homogeneous Islamist faction, but consists of various forces active in the major cities of northern Mali. The city of Gao in the hands of Mujao (Movement for unity and jihad in West Africa), AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) reigns over Timbuktu and Kidal is under the control of militia Ansar Eddine. The Mujao is a movement formed  by dissidents of AQIM, which maintains good relations with the Sahrawis and the Polisario Front.

Besides the differences (mainly related to interest in the distribution of power), these three Islamist groups share common goals such as "maintaining the territorial cohesion of Mali" (instead of the Tuareg, who battle for a liberated Azawad as a sovereign state) and the introduction of Islamic law in its most extreme form. In recent days, there have been two first cases of application of Sharia (1).

Forces of the Tuareg MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) are very weak but still active: there are ongoing negotiations for their support to the national army against the Islamists. In the south, there is an increasing formation of independent militias determined to fight the Islamists. They are often formed by ex-northerners forced to flee.

Intervene?

In this context of constant instability at the international level the hypothesis of a military intervention continues to be evaluated - an idea already launched in the first days of the revolt of the Tuareg. Recently, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence Minister, Laurent Fabius and Jean-Yves Le Drian, declared the support of France to send a peacekeeping force organized by the military of ECOWAS, to contain and finally eliminate the presence of extremists. France, in all cases, will not take the initiative, in a, what Mr Le Drian defined as "inevitable", intervention to prevent the transformation of Mali an Islamic state. Paris is concerned about a "backlash" from terrorist (executions of hostages in Mali, attacks on its territory ...).

Given their weak military capabilities, African countries seem less enthusiastic, hoping foreign support (UN and USA in the first place) to conduct a major intervention operation. Few countries will be able - and determined - to send troops: Niger, Mauritania and Ivory Coast seem determined to intervene early and directly (because they are concerned to have an "extremist neighbor "), even if they do not have the necessary logistical means (and Ivory Coast has its own  internal problems as well).  Algeria refuses to engage outside its borders and Senegal (already committed in Guinea-Bissau) prefers to follow diplomatic channels with Burkina Faso to reach stabilization of the situation in Mali. In this context, the delegation of Burkina Faso met with representatives of Ansar Eddine, who call themselves "pro" mediation and willing to travel to Ouagadougou to continue to discuss, in contrast to Mujao or AQIM which have not met with foreign diplomats. Diplomacy, therefore, seems still an option but is a long complex: it will be chosen if there is no real possibility to intervene militarily.

In this regard, it should be remembered that an invasion with the goal of defeating a well organized terrorist organization is never easy, as we we’re taught Afghanistan. Mali is also a vast territory and very difficult to (re) conquer and control, where the majority jihadist forces are formed by soldiers who know their territory, and are therefore difficult to face. Again relations with the civilian population would be crucial: even if civilian groups openly demonstrated against the Islamists, many are unhappy with the previous administration and especially the brief period of the Tuareg, which are often accused of theft and rape against populations. Many people will join the ranks of the Islamic militias, thinking that only the jihadists can stabilize the country.

Another problem lies in the definition of targets and the conditions of employment of the "anti-extremist" militia: it will be difficult to generate results with an attack "front" because terrorists do not occupy isolated camps but begin to mix with the population in cities. A gradual infiltration with big secret services to neutralize the terrorist forces would work well. In addition, it would prevent the interposition force from making the country more unstable with excessive use of force: every mistake, every civilian casualty would result in increased support for extremists.

Should the authorities finally understand that the way for the country's stability does not only involve suppressing extremist tendencies but also to avoid that current foes will become part of the a new government, we should work together to construct a legitimate government that does not become a new oppressive institution. And, unfortunately, this phase would probably be even more difficult than the fight against "terrorists".

(1)    On July 29, a couple was unmarried and stoning August 8th there was the first amputation of the hand of a suspected thief.

Source: http://imgsrv.wtax.com/image/WiresGraphic/2012-08-15T034923Z_1_CBRE87E0AME00_RTROPTP_2_INTERNATIONAL-US-MALI-CRISIS-FORCE.JPG

African Islamists gather in Northern Mali. The number of Islamist fighters in the Sahel has multiplied by twenty in two years.

Ansar Dine rebels near Timbuktu, northern Mali. Photograph: Romaric Ollo Hien/AFP/Getty Images
Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/17/islamist-extremists-alqaida-uprising-mali
 

According to a study U.S. security, 6000 terrorists roam the Sahel

By Karim Aimeur - Thursday, July 19, 2012 (lexpressiondz.com - ALGERIA)

Original source: http://www.maliweb.net/news/insecurite/2012/07/19/article,80992.html
(Translated from French to English by Thomas den Hollander)

July 19, 2012 Topic: Insecurity, northern Mali

They are heavily armed and well trained to deal with any military assault.

The Sahel becomes a quagmire. A study by the American security research centre, AGWoold, the number of terrorist activating the Sahel has increased 20 times between 2010 and 2012.

According to this study, 300 to 500 in 2010, it rose to more than 6,000 terrorists, equipped and trained in 2012. A boon for the troops of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, which wants to establish theological principalities in the region. But how are terrorists recruited in this particular region in northern Mali? "We are many Africans who came from everywhere to join the mujahedeen from Gao," says a young Ivorian. This young man even has changed his name and is now called
Ahmed El Guédir. It is one of hundreds of recruits in the northern city of Mali controlled by radical Islamists.

The young West Africans landed armed in Gao from Gourma, a province in eastern Burkina Faso, Mali's neighbor but also from Senegal. According to the French news agency AFP, within two days, more than 200 Africans, with an average age of 16, were recruited by the Movement for the uniqueness of Jihad in West Africa (Mujao). New recruits are grouped in two camps in the city and have to undergo military and religious training, said one of the terrorist leaders in the region. Hundreds of Boko Haram fighters, a radical Islamist group responsible for numerous attacks in Nigeria, are now present in northern Mali alongside the Islamists, according to Bilal Hassan, a leader of Mujao in Gao. "Here there are Malians, Somalis, Ivorian, Senegalese, Ghanaians, Gambians, Mauritanians, Algerians, Guineans, Nigerians, there are all Muslims here," said he to the AFP, adding that for a Muslim, there is no nationality or boundary. A native of Mali's neighbor Niger, Hisham Bilal was the first black man to lead a katiba, a fighters brigade, in northern Mali. "There will be other blacks (at the head of katiba). The world is the same for black Muslims, white or other colors", he said.
"The President of Niger (Mahamadou Issoufou) says he will attack us. God only knows. 40% of our workforce are Nigerians. Jihad, God willing, we will take it quickly in Niger", he threatens again.

Mr. Issoufou expressed support for military intervention in northern Mali, envisaged by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to drive out the Islamists.

Bilal Hicham removes this risk by running: "What force is stronger than God? Let them come and bomb us. " "We are all Muslims, at least over 90% in the sub-region (West Africa). We can talk together to find a solution. But if someone decides to use force, then the strength of God will be stronger”, he said. For him, Jihad must be everywhere in West Africa. He says they are ready to plant bombs in West African countries "if necessary".

Ansar Eddine (Defenders of Islam)and Mujao, both allied with al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), controlled the three administrative regions of northern Mali, Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu at the end of March, after ousting the secular Tuareg rebels secessionist.

They have begun to impose Sharia in Timbuktu and destroyed mausoleums of Muslim saints, provoking outrage in Mali and abroad. For their part, people feel abandoned by Gao and cope as best they could with the presence of radical Islamists in their territory.

Apart from banks and some buildings destroyed during the capture of the city in late March and the legacy of fighting in June near the Governor's Palace, Gao looks almost normal, except that there isn’t a single bar or hotel because they are all closed by Islamists.

Northern Mali: Conflict MNLA vs. Ansar Dine and indoctrination

Since Ansar Dine and MNLA fighters took control over northern Mali, also known as Azawad, tensions between the two forces are rising. The basis for those tensions lie in the different objectives MNLA and Ansar Dine seek to achieve. MNLA fought for the liberation of Azawad and Ansar Dine wants to impose sharia law on the whole of Mali by taking control of as much area as possible.

When starting their operation, MNLA and Ansar Dine fought side by side against the government forces of Mali. But when the whole of Azawad was occupied in April and Timbuktu fell in the hands of Ansar Dine, both groups came into conflict with each other about who had the real power in the area. However, on May 25th, after weeks of negotiations, they merged their forces into the National Army of Azawad. The success of te merge is uncertain and recently forces of MNLA and Ansar Dine clashed.

This week some troops of MNLA and Ansar Dine ended up in a mêlee about a flag the MNLA troops had on their vehicle when they were on a road near Goundam. Ansar Dine troops, stationed at a check-point on the road, demanded that the MNLA fighters removed their flag since they only allow the black Islamic flag in their area. A fight broke out and one Ansar Dine and four MNLA fighters got injured. One MNLA member died of his injuries last Saturday.

It seems Ansar Dine is trying to take full control of the area and securing that control for the future by indoctrinating children living in the area. Ansar Dine builds schools and trains young Arab kids (the article states "white skinned", I presume they mean lighter skinned than the average Malian and they probably mean Arabs), 7 - 12 years of age and make them dress like Islamic fighters, wearing traditional clothing, letting them move around the town in small groups.
Ansar Dine also took control of all the government buildings and has raised the black flag on all of them. They also use a truck they've confiscated from the town hall to burn documents and archives outside the town.

(Source: http://www.maliweb.net/news/insecurite/2012/06/20/article,74372.html)

It seems that there is a power struggle going on in Azawad and the outcome is far from clear. MNLA have completed their objective and they seem to have lost the initiative to Ansar Dine who's objective is far from completed and are keen on expanding their power base to be able to continue their struggle for the imposement of sharia law on Mali. It seems unlikely that the MNLA will give up the land they've been fighting over for decades and an escalation of the conflict with Ansar Dine in time seems inevitable.
Meanwhile the government of Mali does not seem to take any real action in taking back control of the northern part of their state. They've been massing some troops but they do not seem to be able to do anything on their own as a result of the lack of logistics and means.

UPDATE:
On June 14 the African Union and ECOWAS have addressed the UN Security Council to make a military intervention possible. UNSC approved but is cautious. Meanwhile some 4.000 Malian forces seem to be preparing for an attack on a few important crossroads.
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95698/Analysis-Intervention-options-in-northern-Mali

Will Azawad become a safe haven for Islamic terrorists?

For decades Touareg from the Sahara have been fighting for a, as they call it, a "free Azawad" in northern Mali. During the revolt in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Touareg fighters have been reported fighting on both sides. In this conflict they've received training and weapons and when the revolt was over they renewed their offensive against the government of Mali in January of this year under the name of Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA). When a coup d'état by discontent soldiers, the discontent ironically enough came from the lack of support of the troops in their war in northern Mali, in March paralized the Malian government even more as they already were in their battle against the Touareg, the latter grabbed the opportunity and successfully intensified their offensive, occupying almost all of Azawad, including the three largest cities: Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.

After, as they said, "achieving their goals", the Touareg declared an independent Azawad. But as soon as the news of the victory spread, trouble doomed on the horizon. Pretty fast after the occupation of Timbuktu reports came in that not the flag of Azawad was flying over the city, but the black flag of Jihad.

Since the beginning of the new offensive in January, the Malian government claimed that members of  Islamic extremist groups Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine were fighting with the Touareg to "liberate" Azawad. The MNLA always denied that this was the case, but as soon as Timbuktu was occupied, the Islamic extremist fighters of Ansar Dine took control and imposed Sharia law on the city. This is a disturbing development. The main goal of the MNLA was to liberate Azawad, Ansar Dine and other extremist groups fight for imposement of the Sharia in the whole of Mali and reject independence. Another group of Islamic extremists from Nigeria also fight for imposing Sharia in their own country: Boko Haram.

The Malian web medium Maliweb.net reported that a few hundred fighters of Boko Haram were seen in Gao and if this is true then the fate of Azawad is uncertain. With AQIM, Boko Haram and other extremist groups taking advantage of the lack of government in Azawad, there is a chance that they will take up their arms together against the Touareg, try to expel the Touareg and make Azawad or parts of it an Islamic state, based on Sharia law and a safe haven for Islamic extremists. If this will happen, a new Yemen or Somalia (where government control is very limited and in some areas non-existent) isn't unthinkable, this time in the unstable region of North West Africa where governments are struggling to take on and solve their internal problems and where the security situation is vulnerable to extremists who want to topple the imbalanced power of the government over distant and hard to control areas. By doing this they will be expanding their own power base and become a force that will be increasingly hard to defeat.

The near future will determine what the fate of Azawad will be. The consequences of an outcome in which the flag of Jihad will rule the whole of Azawad, can be far reaching.

Profiel: MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad)

De oprichting van de Nationale Beweging voor de bevrijding van Azawad is een direct gevolg van de opstand in Libië. De verdreven (en gedode) Libische leider Moammar Ghadaffi had in een poging om Libië voor zich te behouden de Toeareg benaderd voor een bondgenootschap. Een aantal is daar op in gegaan en bond, bewapend door Ghadaffi, de strijd aan met de opstandelingen. Enkele andere Toeareg-groepen kozen juist de kant van de opstandelingen en werden door hen bewapend om Ghadaffi te verdrijven. Na de val van Ghadaffi weigerden de Toeareg van beide zijden de wapens weer in de leveren en gingen deze gebruiken om gezamenlijk hun eigen strijd te gaan voeren voor een Azawad (naar verluid met behulp van Al Qaïda in de Islamitsche Maghreb (AQIM) en andere fundamentalistische groeperingen), een strijd die al sinds het begin van de twintigste eeuw af en toe oplaait en in januari 2012 een nieuwe fase inging. Azawad ligt in het noorden van Mali en beslaat een viertal regio's waaronder Timboektoe. De Touareg beschouwen Azawad als hun thuisland en willen erkenning van de regering in Bamako. Op 21 maart 2012 werd er in Mali door het leger een staatsgreep gepleegd en de Toeareg zagen hun kans schoon om het offensief op te voeren en met succes. Praktisch heel Azawad is inmiddels in hun handen. 

Oprichtingsjaar: 2011

Land van oorsprong: De Sahara (Toeareg wonen in Mali, Libië, Niger, Burkina Faso en Algerije)

Type: Guerillabeweging

Doelstelling: erkenning van de onafhankelijke staat Azawad voor alle volken die daar wonen (dus niet alleen de Toeareg)

Leider: Ag Mohamed Najem (leider van de strijdkrachten)

Troepensterkte: 1000-2500

Medestander(s): Libië (het is de vraag in hoeverre er gesproken kan worden van directe steun door Libië). De regering van Mali zegt dat de MNLA wordt gesteund door AQIM, maar dit is niet aangetoond.

Tegenstander(s): Mali, AFRICOM en tot voor kort Algerije, maar dat heeft in januari de steun ingetrokken om een oplossing in het conflict te forceren.

Staat van oorlog: Momenteel is de onafhankelijkheidsstrijd in volle gang en als gevolg van de staatsgreep en de daardoor ontstane interne problemen in Mali lijkt de MNLA zijn doel te bereiken.

Bewapening: MNLA gebruikt licht en zwaar kaliber hand- en schoudervuurwapens, RPG's en zwaarder materieel, onder andere raketwerpers, luchtafweer en anti-tankgeschut, dat is gemonteerd op pickups.

Operationeel gebied: Het noorden van Mali, Azawad.

Tactiek: Guerilla, bewegingsoorlog

Bekend wapenfeit: Verovering van Timboektoe. Na een succesvol offensief waarbij het grootste deel van Azawad in handen viel van de rebellen, viel de MNLA op 1 april 2012 de buitenwijken van Timboektoe aan, onder andere met door reguliere Malinese troepen achtergelaten wapens. Het Malinese leger was gevlucht en Arabische milities moesten de stad verdedigen. De milities gingen echter niet tot actie over toen de rebellen de stad in namen. Integendeel, militie-eenheden werden gezien met strijders van MNLA en er wordt gespeculeerd of de militie is overgelopen. De MNLA heeft de "volledige bevrijding van Timboektoe" uitgeroepen en op diverse overheidsgebouwen en op de militaire basis werd de vlag van Azawad gehesen. Een totale en belangrijke overwinning van de MNLA waarvan de gevolgen nog moeten blijken. Alles wijst er op dit moment op dat de bevrijding van Azawad op korte termijn een feit is.

Website: http://www.mnlamov.net/